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THE EU SHOULD MERGE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
TO ACHIEVE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE FROM RUSSIA
STEPHEN SEWALK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Russia has seen considerable time in the international policy
spotlight, sending shock waves throughout the international community with its
military support during the para-military led annexation of Ukraine's Crimea
peninsula in March.1 The European Union's ("EU") energy dependence on Russia
has hindered its ability to effectively execute sanctions against Russia for its bold
and aggressive behavior.2 These recent events underline the serious vulnerabilities
of the EU's energy policy and demonstrate how energy dependence has translated
itself into both economic and political dependence.3 The EU should merge its
energy and environmental policy together by abandoning its ineffective European
Union-Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) and adopt a Carbon Tax with
Reinvestment (CTR), reclaiming its autonomy and ensuring the stability of its
multinational economy, while simultaneously ensuring its ability to meet and
exceed its Kyoto commitments.4
In this article, I begin by discussing the history of Russian and European
foreign relations, focusing on the energy policy dynamics and their effect on these
relations. I then examine how Russia's energy policy is a key element to its
foreign relations strategy. Then, the implications of the EU's dependence on
Russian natural gas are discussed, examining the seemingly conflicting interests
between Europe's climate and energy security goals. Finally, I demonstrate how a
* Stephen Sewalk, Ph.D., J.D., is an Assistant Professor for the Bums School of Real Estate and
Construction Management, Daniels College of Business, University of Denver. The author wishes to
thank Paul Chinowsky, Kenneth Strzepek, Frank Barnes, Lorenzo Trujillo, Ved Nanda, Lakshman
Guruswamy, Fred Cheever, Mark Vogel and Rick Leaman for insights on civil, environmental and
power engineering, tax, and environmental aw. Further, the author wishes to thank Vincent Buscarello
for his outstanding research assistance.
1. See William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, 4 SURVIVAL:
GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY 65-80 (4th ed.2014).
2. See Chi-Kong Chyong & Vessela Tchemeva, Europe's vulnerability on Russian gas,
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 1, 6 (Mar. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Chyong & Tchemeva].
3. See id.
4. EU ver-achieved first Kyoto emissions target, on track to meet 2020 objective, EUROPEAN
COMMIssION: CLIMATE CHANGE, (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news2013100901 en.htm. EU emissions since 1990 have
declined 18%, by 2020 the EU committed to reducing emissions by 20%. Id.
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coordinated energy and environmental policy, using a carbon tax with
reinvestment, can significantly reduce built environment emissions while reducing
the EU's dependence on Russia; allowing the EU to address security, economic,
and environmental concerns in a synergetic manner.
A. EU Energy History and Policy
The European Coal and Steel community was created under the Treaty of
Paris. Since the Treaty of Paris, Europe has held that energy policy integration is
fundamental to its security and cohesiveness.6 In 1973, the community would not
only enlarge with three countries joining, but would also be faced with an energy
crisis due to the Arab-Israeli war.7 The EU was heavily dependent on foreign oil
sources, especially from the Middle East, and still remains heavily dependent,
importing over 90% of its oil and 66% of its natural gas.8Against this backdrop of
European cooperation in energy security, I would like to examine Europe's current
challenges with Russia and present my policy solution.
First, previous European energy securities must be considered. Energy
security as a foreign policy issue has long involved issues much more profound
than power generation and raw materials exchange.9 As colonial powers, Europe,
and then the U.S. companies, controlled and owned energy producing areas and
facilities. These firms were named "The Seven Sisters."10 This "first" period of
energy producer consumer relations has since been replaced with the formation of
OPEC in the 1960s, and the reclaiming of energy assets by energy producing
nations." This shifting dynamic has laid the foundation for energy policy being an
issue of international diplomacy, as energy assets and other natural resources
become symbolic of national power and autonomy.12
Europe (and the rest of the world) is now in a third period (identified by
economic historians that is neither colonial-dominated by resource consumers, nor
nationalistic-dominated by resource producers), an era that began
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the spread of liberal values
such as democracy and market economy and the empowerment of
liberal international institutions. The liberalization of the energy sector,
particularly in the EU, entails that energy has increasingly become
5. Raphael Metais, Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a
Geopolitical Approach, EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2013 1, 3 (2013),
https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/page/edp_3_2013_metais.pdf [hereinafter Metais].
6. See id. at 4-5.
7. The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/historyen (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
8. Energy Security Strategy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: ENERGY,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-security-strategy (last visited Nov. 6,
2016).
9. See id.
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subject to the logic of free markets. These last years, however,
producing countries have increasingly resorted to political consideration
in the management of energy. 13
EU Energy trends have thus been marked by a post-World War II pattern of
integration and liberalization.'4 During this period of liberalization, modem day
Russia was still part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR"), which
might have contributed to asymmetric attitudes between Europe and Russia,
especially with regards to energy policy.'5 Liberalization implies that firms have
autonomous control over resources, thereby creating a framework by which
governments have less ability to manipulate either the consumption or production
of energy resources for geopolitical purposes.'6 The EU has been much more
liberal and decentralized regarding their energy policy than Russia, by allowing the
development of national but independent publicly traded companies that pursue
their own economic interests, not solely those of the State." This is partially due
to political economic tradition, but also due to Russia being a sovereign
government, whereas the EU is a collaborative union of many governments.'8 I
will be discussing a united policy for the EU as a single, empowered policy actor,
and, therefore, will begin with a more detailed historical analysis of the EU's
energy policies, beginning in 1990. Since 1990, the EU and surrounding areas have
sustained an economic growth rate of roughly 2% GDP per capita.'9  Energy
intensive sectors (industries that require very high energy consumption to sustain
output) have grown at a slower rate than the economy overall, causing the energy
sector to grow at a correspondingly slower rate.20 Regardless, economic growth
has sustained a clear growth in the aggregate energy needs of the EU. 21 This
conclusion is illustrated by the steady rise in imported energy over the past 25
22years. The European Commission projects this reliance to increase at an
alarming rate, with the EU importing over 67% of their energy supply by 2030.23
Thus, Europe faces significant structural pressure to obtain energy security via
greater leverage in securing supply abroad, create a strategy to decrease imports
via better production at home, or implement policies that work towards both of
these objectives.24
The modem era of European energy policy can be defined by the EU's
13. Metais, supra note 5, at 5.
14. See id at 12-14.
15. See id at 18.
16. See id.
17. See NEVEN MIMKA, EMPOWERING DEVELOPMENT DELIVERING RESULTS IN THE DECADE OF
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL, 5-6 (European Commission, ed., 2015).
18. Id. at 5.
19. See EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSP., EUROPEAN
ENERGY AND TRANSPORT: SCENARIOS ON KEY DRIVERS, 36 (2004).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 26.
23. See id
24. See id. at 135.
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commitments to lowering CO 2 emissions, which has been a defining factor in its
modem energy policy approach.25  This commitment has made several EU
countries leaders in producing energy that does not emit carbon, carbon
equivalents, or other environmentally detrimental emissions.26 However, this
commitment is also one of the major forces driving Europe to import energy
sources.27 An integrated approach throughout the EU is crucial to success in
energy security.28 The EU must either import less energy or demonstrate that i is
capable of importing less energy if it is to achieve energy security while also
strengthening its standing in international policy. Research in energy economics
and foreign policy can be utilized to illustrate that this is the case.29
1. European Natural Gas Consumption
Collectively, the EU member states are the world's largest energy importer,
importing about 55% of their energy supply.30 The EU imports approximately
64% of its natural gas in order to reduce its carbon dioxide and greenhouse
emissions.31 These imports are not simply for convenience or price, for only a
handful of European states could cope with a disruption of this supply
economically.32 The European Commission forecasts that the EU will import over
80% of its natural gas needs by 2030.33 Russia remains one of Europe's most
important natural gas suppliers, accounting for 41% of European gas imports in
2013,34 and with several countries importing over 80% of their Natural Gas from
Russia. With projections of increased natural gas consumption, coupled with the
decline of domestic natural gas production,36 the EU's dependence on Russia as a
supplier can only be expected to grow unless policy actions reverse this
dependence.
Today, twelve EU member states depend on Gazprom, the state-run Russian
25. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN ENERGY AND TRANSPORT: SCENARIOS ON KEY DRIVERS
12 (2015) [hereinafter Renewable energy progress report].
26. Id. "Green", "renewable" or "clean" energy" are common ways of referring generally to
various technologies that can produce energy without significant environmental harm and resource
depletion.
27. Id.
28. See Metais, supra note 5.
29. Id.
30. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROSTAT STATISTICS EXPLAINED 1 (Jul. 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Energy_production-and imports#FurtheEur
ostatinformation [hereinafter Eurostat Statistics Explained].
31. Id.
32. See Chyong & Tcherneva, supra note 2.
33. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 - update 2005, at
27 (2006).
34. See Eurostat Statistics Explained, supra note 30.
35. See Chyong & Tchemeva, supra note 2 ("[tlhe Central and East European countries still
import a large proportion of their natural gas from Russia: Hungary imports around 89 percent of its
annual consumption from Russia; Poland imports 53 percent (2013); the Czech Republic, 99 percent;
and Slovakia, 95 percent.").
36. See Chyong & Tcherneva, supra note 2.
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natural gas producer, for more than half of their natural gas consumption, and in
some cases, they are entirely dependent.3 7 Europe's glaring dependency has been a
concern for decades, but the current political crisis in Ukraine has accentuated the
urgent need for Europe to diversify its energy sources, particularly in respect to
natural gas.3 8 As I discussed above and will explore further below, Gazprom is an
example of a mechanism through which the state in an energy producing country
obtains greater control of resource production to use as a foreign policy tool.
Gazprom dominates Russia's upstream (the exploration and production of
natural gas) and downstream (marketing and istribution), with over $106 billion
USD in revenue, even when geo political conflict begins to affect the revenue
flow.3 9 This significant influx of cash has given President Putin significant
leverage both domestically and internationally.40  The State Owned Enterprise
("SOE") is more than willing to participate actively in accordance with Putin's
interests.4 1 There are many examples of Gazprom using shutdown threats as a
policy tool.42 EU policy in the early 1990's was to help Russia increase exports;43
however, this policy would make the EU more dependent despite its dominance of
Russian gas production.44 Gazprom has not been the most reliable partner for
Europe, as Gazprom has been accused of being nontransparent about its abilities to
sustain exports and commitments to improve infrastructure.45  Despite these
shortcomings, there is no reason to think Gazprom will stop growing, as it begins
to seize significant development opportunities in Central Asia.46 As the graphic
below shows, the natural gas consumption of Europe implies that Gazprom and all
Russian natural gas producers represent a vital piece of this discussion.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See Gazprom's net profits down sevenfold in '14 on conflict in Ukraine, CHINA POST (Apr.
30, 2015), http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/company-focus/2015/04/30/434792/Gazproms-
net.htm.
40. See Quinten Parret, Whither Gazprom? The EU and Russia's gas, LA REUVUE GEOPOLITIC,
(Nov. 1,
2007), http://www.dip loweb.com/Whither-Gazprom-The-EU-and-Russia.html [hereinafter Parret].
4 1. Id.
42. Andrew Monaghan, EU Energy Cooperation, in EU RussIA CENTRE, THE EU-RUSSIA
REVIEW 29
(2006).
43. 1 participated on a European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) project o
provide Russia with over $1 billion in funding to expand natural gas exports to the EU to increase
Russia's ability to earn foreign exchange following its economic collapse from 1989 to 1994. The
author, who worked as a financial specialist, modeled gas exports and Russian tax collection to show
the viability of the expansion and worthiness of the loan package to support the Yeltsin government.
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Figure 1: EU Dependence on Russian Natural Gas47
The EU's reliance on Gazprom and other Russian exporters is only expected to
increase, as several EU countries try to reduce emissions by shutting down coal
plants and replacing them with natural gas imports. 48 Coal is one of the highest
emitting energy sources per unit of energy, and in several European countries
energy consumption is nearly 30% coal .4 It should be noted that Poland, one of
these coal dependent countries, is creating its own natural gas infrastructure, thus
providing an example of a European power beginning to replace natural gas
imports."o By definition, this can only come with significant investment. Thus, via
Gazprom, the Russian state has retained significant control of its natural resource
base, and via European reliance on natural gas, has retained significant influence
over EU-Russian relations.
47. MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42405, EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY:
OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES To NATURAL GAS SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION 10 (2013).
48. See Chyong & Tcherneva, supra note 2 ("In addition to the member states already dependent
on Russian gas, in a few others, coal consumption dominates the energy mix. If European climate
policy is effective in driving these member states to reduce CO2 emissions by diversifying away from
coal consumption, then their exposure to natural gas supply security will grow: gas is likely to be the
next fuel of choice because of its relative competitiveness when compared to other low-carbon energy
sources (renewables, coal with carbon capture and storage, nuclear and so on). This could apply to
Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.")
49. See id.
50. See id.
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2. EU Energy Production
As shown in Figure 2, the EU expects to reduce fuel and gas based production
significantly, due to better climate policy and advancements in clean technology.




51. See P. CAPROS ET AL., EU ENERGY, TRANSPORT AND GHG EMISSIONS TRENDS TO 2050, at
49 (ed. European Commission 2013) [hereinafter Emissions Trends].
52. See id.
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This commitment to advancement in clean technology is demonstrated by the
projections, as renewable energy sources are the only energy sources projected to
continue to grow.53 Concerns about Nuclear energy in the wake of Fukushima
have dampened prospects for growth in Nuclear energy production.54 Increased
security protocols and a united European effort will need to be established if
nuclear energy is going to play a role in Europe's future.5 The previous figure
shows that traditional sources of (carbon) energy with high levels of emissions are
still a large part of the total energy-mix (supply and demand for energy), so the EU
still must find a way to continue to increase investment rates in clean energy.5 6
Despite major advancements in clean energy, natural gas (both local and imported)
will be crucial to European energy demand without significant shifts in policy.5 7
The EU is a leader in the field of clean energy.5 8 The EU has excelled at
producing clean energy and cutting emissions, producing 39% of the world's clean
energy.59 While impressive, the growth in this industry is starting to taper out in
Europe, with key countries falling below the global average.6 0 Therefore, the EU
has a strong incentive to consider trade policies that will keep its energy intensive
industries competitive.6 ' Europe has already begun to attempt to consider these
trade policies, but these considerations have been met with fierce opposition.
62
The EU's ability to raise revenue from carbon energy taxes, in order to pay for its
clean energy programs, is uncertain under current policy.
The European Commission has been transparent in its energy production
projections, under which production that occurs in Europe is expected to slowly
decrease, with production from high emissions sources shrinking more rapidly than
green energy sources.63 Reliance on energy imports, including natural gas and oil
imports from Russia will continue to increase as European oil and natural gas
fields face natural production decline.64 Therefore, while Europe exhibits unique
strengths as an energy producer, there are significant concerns about energy
security that I believe are directly related to its environmental policy resulting in a
complicated foreign policy and relationship with Russia, given Russia's oversized
53. See id.
54. See id. at 11, 18-19.
55. See id. at 11, 18-19, 45.
56. See id. at 49.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, at 39, BP,
bp.com/statisticalreview#BPstats (last visited Dec. 8, 2016) [hereinafter BP].
60. See id. at 5.
61. See Fr~dric Branger & Philippe Quirion, Would border carbon adjustments prevent carbon
leakage and heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic
studies, 99 Ecological Economics 10 (2014).
62. See Scott Barrett, Rethinking Climate Change Governance and its Relationship to the World
Trading System, 20 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1863, 1864 (2011).
63. See Emissions Trends, supra note 51, at 17.
64. See id.
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importance as a provider of oil and natural gas to the EU.6 5 These concerns are
significant and involve the fundamental structural dynamics of the modem EU.
3. Russian "Energy Diplomacy"
There are significant concerns about infrastructure and cooperation, but the
fact remains that Russia has over twenty times the gas reserves that the EU does.
Geography has forced Europe and Russia to cooperate for the better part of the last
century, dating long before Russia was considered a capitalist democracy.6 ' The
structure of these exports hasn't changed much; one expert notes that "[e]ver since
Soviet times, Russian gas production has been relying on three large gas
condensate fields at Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhe, in North-Western
Siberia."68 Whereas the structure of most energy relationships can shift rapidly,
the way natural gas is exported implies a slow evolution in its export stats.69
While the EU continues its heavy investment in clean energy, despite the lackluster
reaction from the rest of the world,70 it faces increased challenges in securing
natural gas, a vital part of its energy mix.n Unlike oil, which is fungible in the
international marketplace and can easily be shipped by tanker from one location to
another, most of the EU's gas imports are by pipeline, making them non-fungible,
because they cannot easily move the pipeline to replace them.72 Thus, if there is a
problem with the supplier, it is difficult to quickly source natural gas from another
region. Approximately half of all the natural gas that Russia ships to the EU goes
through the Ukraine via pipeline.7n Threatening to terminate or alter gas exports as
a method of coercing various actors, termed the "tap weapon",74 is a serious issue
for the EU. Russia has twice leveraged its vast natural gas resources as a
diplomatic weapon, shutting off gas to Ukraine amid trade disputes in 2006 and
again in 2009 during the winter months, months where natural gas consumption is
highest due to its use as a heating fuel and storage is declining. On each
65. See Chyong & Tcherneva, supra note 2.
66. See Metais, supra note 5, at 7.
67. Kenneth Rapoza, Russia Welcomes Capitalism . .. Again, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2011, 08:24
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/04/18/russia-welcomes-capitalism-
again/#318e45ae1318.
68. See Parret, supra note 40, at 6.
69. See id. at 5.





72. See BP, supra note 59, at 28.
73. See Maria Galluci, Europe Unprepared if Russia Cuts Off Natural Gas Exports to EU this
Summer, Analysts Say, IBT (Jul. 7, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/europe-unprepared-if-
russia-cuts-natural-gas-exports-eu-summer-analysts-say- 1643986.
74. See Bertil Nygren, Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region, 55 PROBLEMS
OF POST COMMuNisM 3, 4 (2008).
75. See Mert Bilgrin, Geopolitics of European natural gas demand: Supplies from Russia,
Caspian and the Middle East, 37 ENERGY POLICY 4482 (2009) [hereinafter Bilgrin].
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occasion, Europe inevitably suffered the downstream consequences.76 Rather than
act to become energy independent from Russia, Europe has merely proposed
alternate pipelines to bring the same Russian gas to the EU.n
The relationship between the EU and Russia is not a simple issue for the
Kremlin to deal with either. Russia's exports of natural gas ($73 billion USD) and
oil ($283 billion USD) are a non-trivial asset, making up 68% of Russia's total
export revenues in 2013. The relationship between the EU and Russia is not a
simple issue for the Kremlin to deal with either. Russia's exports of natural gas
($73 billion USD) and oil ($283 billion USD) are a non-trivial asset, making up
68% of Russia's total export revenues in 2013.79 Natural gas imports could
represent a major point of policy leverage if Europe could find alternatives, even if
those alternatives came at a significant cost. Recent occurrences in Crimea serve to
amplify the urgency of moving away from energy dependence on Russia,o which
can only be accomplished by diversifying European energy sources and moving
towards renewable energy.8 ' The EU has expressed desires for a better integrated
energy investment strategy, and is already a leader in renewable energy.82  I
believe Europe is poised to make great strides in energy security. Below I expand
upon this relationship in depth.
a. Gas, the USSR, and Reagan
Despite deep tensions dating all the way back to the cold war, geographic
proximity has made Russia a natural energy trading partner with the EU in terms of
exporting natural gas. This set the stage for a complicated energy relationship
between Russia and the EU. The EU and Russia's natural gas based economic
relationship dates back to the early cold war, a significant twenty first century
example being the 1964 "friendship" gas pipeline from the USSR to West
Germany.8 3 A significant amount of the infrastructure still used today to export
gas to the EU from Russia dates back to some of the original pipelines built during
the Soviet era in Russia.84 These pipelines were created back in the early 80s,
76. Id.
77. See Emissions Trends, supra note 51, at 6.
78. See Alexander Metelitsa, Oil and natural gas sales accounted for 68% of Russia's total
export revenues in 2013, US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17231.
79. See Alexander Metelitsa, Oil and natural gas sales accounted for 68% of Russia's total
export revenues
in 2013, U.S. Energy Information Administration (Oct. 3, 2016, 9:30 AM),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfn?id=1 7231.
80. See Chyong & Techerneya, supra note 2; see also Bilgrin, supra note 75.
81. See Chyong & Techerneya, supra note 2.
82. See BP, supra note 59, at 5.
83. See Peter Rutland, Russia as an Energy Superpower, 13 NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 203, 205
(2008).
84. See Vasily Astrov, Current State and Prospects of the Russian Energy Sector, 363 THE
VIENNA INST. FOR INT'L ECON. STUD.: RESEARCH REPORTS 1, 17 (2010).
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despite protests from the Reagan administration that caused tensions between all 3
actors.85
Natural gas is a more diplomatically complicated good to trade than other
assets, as the transfer infrastructure for this good (pipelines) are stagnant, capital
intensive, and exclusive to the good itself, unlike the transfer infrastructure for
most other goods, which returns to the origin source (ships, planes, and trains)." It
is therefore difficult to replace partners (for both producers and consumers).8 7
Reagan explicitly mentioned the possibility of Soviet "blackmail", using threats to
gas supply as a reason not to build the pipelines as proposed,8 8 similar to the tap
weapon. The EU and Russia both felt the Reagan administration was imposing
national U.S. interests and legal precedents in a territory that did not belong to
them.89 Experts suggested trying to create a true regional consensus at the time,
while the U.S. wanted to pursue a harder line with the then USSR.90 What
emerged was a solution somewhere in between, as the USSR became a
complicated Russian democracy with the state still playing a large role in the
energy market.91
b. Post-Soviet Russia
Following the collapse of the USSR, and the creation of Russia under
President Yeltsin, Yeltsin proceeded to privatize as much of Russian industry as
possible.92 This was done by issuing vouchers and distributing them to 144 million
people. By the end of 1994 Russia had managed to transfer ownership of seventy
percent of large and medium-sized companies and ninety percent of small
companies.94 Gazprom was never privatized, although some shares were sold on
domestic and international markets to place a value on the firm.95 However, control
of energy supplies never experienced real independence from the state, under and
after Yeltsin, and Gazprom emerged as the state supported giant and foreign policy
tool in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR.96 Gazprom joined several SOEs
in providing energy infrastructure for cheap or free to struggling parts of the
Russian economy in exchange for tax breaks, causing them to act more like a state
85. Harold Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. OF COMP. LAW
579, 580-81 (1983).
86. See Metais, supra note 5, at 6.
87. See id.
88. Maier, supra note 85, at 580.
89. See id. at 579-80.
90. See id
91. See id. 486-86.





96. See Daniel Treisman, After Yeltsin Comes. . . Yeltsin, 117 FOREIGN POL'Y 74, 76, 78-79
(1999-2000).
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institution and less like a private enterprise.9 7 These chaotic early years helped
Gazprom establish deep ties in the Russian state.98 This sort of practice is common
in economies based on natural resources: Russia is far from alone in using SOEs to
manage natural resources, as a way of centralizing investments in infrastructure
and controlling energy exports for more effective diplomacy.99
When the USSR fell, there was a broad attempt to construct a stable
democracy and embrace values that were considered foreign: democracy and
capitalism.00 This implementation in Russia and in other countries has been a
definitive trend for the modern context of energy and foreign policy.10 ' Of course,
theory and implementation offer all sorts of difficulties. Countries attempting to
transition to capitalist societies are often plagued with difficulties related to erasing
cultural norms and controlling corruption, a post-soviet Russia was no
exemption.1 02 The balancing act between Russian values and a new system of
democracy and capitalism, set to the aforementioned wealth of natural gas, created
the problematic context of the current relationship between Russia and the EU,
which is dissected below.
c. Putin's Russia
Current Russian President Vladimir Putin has initiated a reawakening of a
sort of expansive, even imperialist, foreign policy by Russia, beginning with the
controversial article "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium." 0 3 This article is
often pointed to as the beginning of the post-Yeltsin era in which Russia is cast as
a united and patriotic global force.104 In this article, Putin implores Russia to rally
around diverse concepts, from traditional Russian values to making Statism work
within market mechanisms.ios He distances himself from what at the time was
recent Russian history, attacking the practicality of communism in no uncertain
terms.10 6  Regardless, Putin uses this work to set the stage for a much more
aggressive, nationalistic approach to Russian foreign policy.
Putin has continued to pursue a united and powerful Russia. His
presidency has overseen significant economic and social progress in Russia, which
he attributes to his policies.0 7 However, this growth was actually attained because
97. See id at 78.
98. See id
99. Metais, supra note 5, at 12.
100. See id. at 5.
101. See id.
102. See Treisman, supra note 96, at 58.





107. See Anders Aslund, Russia's Economic Transformation under Putin, 45 EURASIAN
GEOGRAPHY AND EcoNoMiCS 6, 397-420 (2004).
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of the rapid and sustained increase in the price of oil from 1998 to 2008 and its
rapid recovery following the recession of 2008.08
Figure 3: Russian GDP 1992-2016'09
Rusian Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
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The default on debt followed by a rapid rise in oil prices helped reduce inflation
and allow stability to return to the Russian economy as demonstrated in Figure 4
and Table 1.
108. See id. at 397-99.
109. Figure 3 was created by the author with information from INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
imf.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
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Following the devaluation of 1998 the Russian government moved from deficit to
budget surplus as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Russia Key Monetary Indicators..
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Percent)
GDP growth 1.4 5.3 6.3 10.0 5.0 4.3
Inflation (end of period) 11.0 84.5 36.6 201 18.6 15.1
Monetary growth'
Target 2230 1826 2125 2734 2428
Outcome 20 57 62 40 32
International reserves
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 17.8 10.9 12.4 27,9 34.5 47.8
Sources: Russian authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
'M2 from the Central Bank of Russia's "Basic Guidelines of State Integrated Monetary
Policy" for relevant years.
- \ r~Jfldi11.
110. See Russia Rebounds, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, (David Owen & David 0.
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Once President, Putin swiftly started implementing various reforms mentioned in
his controversial article, building on the need for reform highlighted by the 1998
financial crisis and the political inertia toward sweeping reform that had already
been established.' 12 Many of the first and most important reforms were fiscal:
Putin started by making large cuts in government expenditures deemed wasteful."3
He also instituted highly praised tax reforms, including a flat tax and lower
corporate taxes, which while controversial on a global scale appealed well to the
context of corruption and excessive bureaucracy.114 This tax reform included large
taxes on natural resource companies, a move that could be interpreted as a strategy
to weaken the independence to Russian oligarchs, ensuring more de facto political
power stayed in the Kremlin. "
The economic and fiscal benefits of Putin's well implemented and
opportunistic reforms has major political effects; major businessmen and corrupt
officials that were well situated before reform lost significant political clout to the
state. Putin impressively managed to liberalize key sectors while increasing the
power of the state.1 17 However, it must be pointed out that the restructuring of key
monopolies is not complete.''8 Putin's reforms, while substantial, seem to place a
focus on keeping the state deeply involved in the management of natural resources,
keeping these resources available as a foreign policy weapon.' 9 This appears to
correspond to Putin's philosophy as expressed in his writings that preceded his
presidency.2 0
As detailed above, many of Putin's reforms have inarguable positive
effects. Increased solidarity and support for Putin carries with it serious
geopolitical implications, especially for energy security. Putin's history in the
KGB and souring relationships between NATO and Russia at the time of his
inauguration caused the relationship between Russia and the EU to become even
more tense than before. 12 The distrust (or at least suspicion) between Putin and
the EU, as detailed in the following section, was exacerbated by various economic
and even military events.
Russia using its energy wealth to coerce its trading partners is neither
simple nor objectively beneficial for long-term Russian interests, especially those
of the Russian people. The effectiveness of natural resource control as a coercive
force depends on the price of the resource.122 In Russia's case, poor infrastructure
112. See Aslund, supra note 107.
113. See id at 402.
114. See id. at 400, 404.
115. See id. at 400.
116. See id. at 401-02.
117. See id.
118. See Rutland, supra note 83, at 205.
119. See generally Harley Balzer, The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy, 21 POsT-SOVIET
AFFAIRS 210 (2005).
120. See id.
121. See Rutland, supra note 83, at 204.
122. See Metais, supra note 5, at 20.
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has limited Europe's faith in the reliability of Russian natural gas exports, as well
as significantly damaging the potential economic benefits of these exports for all
parties involved.123 Regardless of this and other factors, as detailed below, Russia
has shown itself willing to make the necessary sacrifices to use natural gas as a
coercive policy tool to force Europe to not interfere with Russian interests,
including political expansion that does not comply with international law. 124 Once
this fact has been established, the proposed policy for European energy security
will be deeply relevant to the context of European-Russian relations.
II. PUTIN AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF RUSSIAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY
Vladimir Putin has made incredible strides in uniting Russian interests and
various power players as detailed above. It has been detailed how deeply the
administration's strategy of control is based on natural resource control.125 Several
important large players in Russian politics have been moved around with the
intention of centralizing the management of natural resources.126 This is indicative
of how important natural resources are to Putin's governing style. How this relates
to his way of relating with Europe is detailed below.
A. Russian Energy Superpower
Russia's principle upper hand in all negotiations is that the EU is involved
in lies within its control of valuable natural resources, principally natural gas.12 7
Russia is the world's leading natural gas producer, controls the export paths of
many other large producers, and is highly ranked for several other energy
commodities.12 8 While other exports may be threatened in diplomatic breakdowns
at some point, this work on European Energy Security will focus on natural gas, as
it has been historically Russia's diplomatic weapon of choice. 29 Managing this
resource has been difficult due to what political scientists and economists call the
"resource curse", wherein managing single commodity can result in high
corruption and mismanagement due to the relative value of the exported good.1
30
Russia has also had to work at managing currency appreciation resulting from its
resource endowment (known to some as "Dutch disease").131
Without observable examples of the aggressive aspects of Putin's
philosophy, it might be argued that the defensive rhetoric of Putin was mostly to
unite Russians and gain votes rather than to demonstrate his real intentions.
Experience and data, however, do not support this interpretation, but show that
Russia is at least willing to try and use its energy endowment to push various
123. See Astrov, supra note 84, at 17-18.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See generally Balzer, supra note 119, at 211.
127. Nygren, supra note 74, at 13.
128. See Rutland, supra note 83, at 203.
129. Nygren, supra note 74, at 5.
130. See Rutland, supra note 83, at 205-06.
131. See Rutland, supra note 83, at 206.
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foreign policy agendas.132 The tap weapon has been relevant since the 1990s, but
has proven a much more serious threat under Putin.'3 3 While there are other
nations that export gas in the region, pipelines that flow to Europe are almost
always built through Russia, so they do not constitute alternative options in the
case of a gas shutdown.134 Two examples of Russia's willingness to use this
strategy stand out in recent history: the conflicts and ensuing gas cut offs to
Ukraine in 2006 and 2009.135 These examples highlighted energy security as a
need, something explicitly acknowledged by the European Commission. 136
1. The Ukrainian Gas Crisis in 2006
Putin appointed a former Gazprom executive as ambassador to Ukraine in
2001, highlighting the deeply connected nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations and
natural gas.' 3 7  This could have solidified a very smooth relationship with the
Ukrainian state, if the Ukrainian state had survived the "Orange Revolution" 3
years later." 8  Due to this peaceful government shift, Putin found himself
negotiating with a new government that was more closely aligned with democracy
and the EU. 139  Gazprom made plans to replace subsidized pricing given to
previous governments in favor of "market prices", as well as calling in debts and
accusing Naftogaz, the Ukrainian national natural gas company, of taking gas that
should have ended up in Europe.140 Negotiations over new pricing went sour in
2005.141 Ukraine threatened to take gas destined for Europe, which resulted in a
complex agreement involving Gazprom, Ukrainian Authorities, the EU,
Turkmenistan, and some other central Asian countries.142
The foremost result was much higher gas revenue and a strengthened
bargaining position for Russia.'43  The compromise was widely criticized by
Ukrainians.'44 Russia also retained a significant amount of control over the natural
gas transmission.'45 Ukrainian gas consumption now originated from a diverse set
of sources, much of the exported gas still flowed through Russian territory.146
132. See Nygren, supra note 74.
133. See id. at 5.
134. See id. at 13.
135. See id. at 5-6.
136. Metais, supra note 5, at 4.
137. Nygren, supra note 74, at 5.
138. See id. at 6.
139. Id. at 6.
140. See Ukraine takes extra Russian gas, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2016, 11:36GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4642684.stm.
141. See Nygren, supra note 74, at 6.
142. Id. at 6.
143. See SIMON PIRANI ET AL., THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN GAS DISPUTE OF JANUARY 2009: A
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 9 (2009).
144. Nygren, supra note 74, at 6.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 6.
67
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Exacerbating this effect, Ukraine was not permitted to negotiate with
these new partners directly.1 47  While this dispute arose from a set of basic
economic disputes spurred by political context, the important effects on the EU of
gas shutdowns showed the world that Russia owned a significant policy bargaining
chip that it was willing to use.'48 While being able to avoid shocks to supply,
various different conflicts and disagreements continued to sprout between Russia
and its gas trading partners.'49 Against the backdrop of a complex Russian
"victory" in 2006, and uncertainties still plaguing Eastern Europe, the next conflict
began to form.'5 0
2. Gas Shut Off in 2009
The 2009 Gas shut off occurred over issues similar to the previous
crisis.'5 ' Prices, taxes, and other financial disputes built upon new factors like
internal conflicts between various politicians and gas producers in Kiev.' 52 Both of
these disputes affected not just Ukraine, but also the EU at large. '5 A key
difference between 2006 and 2009 was that the 2009 dispute was much more
severe, resulting in a total supply shutoff to Ukraine, including gas that was
intended for the EU.1 54 Some countries experienced economic rises, with certain
Balkan states even experiencing what EU officials termed a "humanitarian
emergency[.]"'5 5  This pulled the EU into the conflict. Ukraine had explicitly
requested European involvement in settling the dispute.5 6
An extensive agreement on prices and gas delivery was signed at the
tipping point of the global financial crisis in October 2008.'15 However, debt
obligations of Naftogaz detailed in this agreement were not met (according to
Gazprom) and the dispute escalated rapidly.5 8 After repeated warnings about not
reaching an agreement, Putin oversaw the cutting of gas supplies on January 1,
2009.' As mentioned above, the effects were widespread and powerful, despite
the crises only lasting three weeks.16 0
The agreement that ended the dispute was not completely one sided,
suggesting that despite Russia's advantageous position, Putin either did not believe
147. See PIRANI ET AL., supra note 143, at 9.
148. See Metais, supra note 5, at 7.
149. See Nygren, supra note 74, at 6.
150. See id.
151. See Ukraine asks EU to take part in settlement of Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute, INTERFAX-
UKRAINE, (Jan. 1, 2009), http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/4213.html.
152. See PIRANI ET AL., supra note 143, at 10, 12.
153. Metais, supra note 5, at 7.
154. PIRANI ET AL., supra note 143, at 22.
155. Id. at 4.
156. See Ukraine asks EU to take part in settlement of Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute, INTERFAX-
UKRAINE (Jan. 1, 2009), http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/4213.html.
157. See PIRANI ET AL., supra note 143, at 15.
158. Id. at 16.
159. Id. at 19.
160. Id at 63.
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Russia held all the power in negotiations with Ukraine or he felt it necessary to
give Ukraine certain concessions.'6 ' The deal aims to establish ten years of gas
provision and establishes prices below what Europe pays for gas just for
Ukraine. 162 That said, Putin clearly flexed the foreign clout granted to him from
being in control of Gazprom.63 Gazprom was the only Russia to Ukraine exporter,
and Naftogaz faces large financial burdens under strict repayment terms.164 The
Ukranian President at the time, Viktor Yushchenko, was himself a critic of the
deal, even though he decided to respect it (he had no other choice).6 5 Because of
the need for natural gas by other countries, particularly for heating (during winter
months) and production of electricity, this gives Russia, and especially Putin,
coercive power through the "tap weapon."
3. Crimea and Energy Policy in the 2014 Land Disputes
By way of the annexation of Crimea and ongoing pursuit of sovereignty
in disputed regions, Russia is not blatantly violating international law, but
exploiting a tension within the post-World War II international order between self-
determination and acquisition of territory.166 This is not unlike actions taken by
the United States to expand its influence.167 However, the precedent being
exploited may destabilize other parts of the world, and it does constitute a stretch
in policy by Russia claiming to protect individual rights by annexing territory.168
Much of the Crimean population, while living under the Ukrainian government, is
Russian speaking and identify ethnically as Russian.169 Crimeans see this identity
as having political significance, voting in March of 2014 to become a Russian
territory and leave Ukrainian rule.170
Putin took advantage of this vote, lining military up at the Ukrainian
border and likely supporting pro-Russian paramilitary groups while denying any
direct involvement currently.i'' While defending the referendum, Putin subtly
insisted on his right to defend "Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking
people."72 Russia has stopped gas transmission over financial disputes,'7 so it is
161. See id at 26-28.
162. Id. at 26.
163. See PIRANI ET AL., supra note 143, at 26-30.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 30.
166. See William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, Faculty
Scholarship Paper 1360, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2014),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edulfacultyscholarship/ 360.
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id. at 1-3.
169. Ukraine's sharp divisions, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-26387353.
170. Burke-White, supra note 166, at 1-3.
171. Burke-White, supra note 166, at 5.
172. Burke-White, supra note 166, at 4.
173. See generally PASQUALE DE MICCO, CHANGING PIPELINES, SHIFTING STRATEGIES: GAS IN
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE 4-21 (2015).
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hard to think that the tap weapon is off the table in this dispute. While certain
arguments can be made in favor of a Russian Crimea, the EU should not be
crippled by energy security needs in attempting to be a force for neutrality and
intemational law in this dispute.
The EU would be unable to stop importing Russian natural gas tomorrow,
unless it arrives at a comprehensive new energy and environmental plan. However,
continued dependence on Russian natural gas leaves the EU exposed to Russia's
tap weapon for its political and economic goals under President Putin.17 4 Given
recent events,s7 5 this would be problematic not just for the energy policy of the EU,
but for regional sovereignty. The recent Russian attempts o annex Crimea have
actually contributed to European solidarity at a time when economic crisis has
pushed EU member states apart on various issues.' 76 However, it is relevant to
note that public perception in Europe is that the EU has acted weak in the face of
Russian aggression. 177 It has been suggested Putin and his actions might be what
the EU needs to unite politically. 78
Not only were sanctions against Russia imposed following the downing of
Malaysia flight 17 in the ongoing paramilitary conflict in Ukraine, but the EU has
also begun to implement strategies to cut its reliance on Russian energy exports.' 79
This proves that the EU is fully aware of the threat that Russia can pose with the
tap weapon. If there were reason to believe Russia was rather limited in using gas
exports to coerce foreign govemments, the EU's reaction to Crimea would center
on diplomatic relations and military involvement. The inclusion of energy as a
part of the European response to Russian aggression proves that European energy
security is a foreign policy and global security issue, not just an economic one.
4. Altemate Proposed Energy Routes
Despite the fact that, as mentioned above, the EU has publicly called
enhancing energy security a priority, so an economically weakened Eurozone is
objectively on the path to greater, not lesser, dependence on Russia,'8 1 as I will
show in this and the following sections. Greece has recently reversed its policy and
allowed for more pipeline construction through its territory from Russia, and
Gazprom has claimed to reach a deal with several other European energy
174. Id. at 20.
175. For example, Russia annexing the Crimea. See generally Burke-White, supra note 166.
176. Tatia Dolidze, EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee's Game of
Thrones 4-5 (CEPS, Working Paper No. 402, 2015),
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companies to start exporting more natural gas.'82  The Greek (and Turkish)
pipelines may double in capacity, according to Gazprom, all while the EU has
stated the need for energy security.'8 3 Additionally, the EU has even filed an anti-
monopoly claim against Gazprom.184
As a result, the EU has struggled to send a unified message to Russia and
Putin regarding energy dependence, by being involved in alternate gas routes
around Ukraine while also criticizing and imposing sanctions on Russia for
annexing Crimea. 185 This project and similar projects have been sharply criticized
for granting Russia increased influence via more gas exports.186 While certain new
projects can improve efficiency, there are no proposed pipeline changes that will
drastically cut European consumption of natural gas, nor give the EU better supply
control.8 7  The two major pipeline projects that have been proposed,
Balticonnector and Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania, aim to diversify sources
and protect security, but neither project clearly demonstrates a way to decrease
Russian imports dramatically.8 8
III. EU's ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Since 1990, the EU and surrounding area has sustained a significant economic
growth rate of roughly 2% GDP per capita.'89 Energy intensive sectors (industries
that require very high energy consumption to sustain output)' 90 have grown
somewhat slower than the economy over all, causing the overall energy sector to
grow much slower.'9 ' Regardless, this economic growth has sustained a clear
growth in the energy needs of the EU, illustrated by the steady rise in imported
energy over the past two and a half decades.'92  The European Commission
projects this reliance to increase at an alarming rate, given reasonable assumptions,
with the EU importing over 67% of their energy supply by 2030. 193 Thus, Europe
faces significant structural pressure to obtain energy security via greater leverage
in securing supply abroad, create a strategy to decrease imports via better
182. See Nektaria Stamouli & James Marson, Greece to Sign Russian Gas Pipeline Deal, WALL




185. Id; Roxana loana Banciu, South Stream Project and the Ukrainian Factor, 15 ROMANIAN J.
EUR. AFF. 55 (2015).
186. Roxana loana Banciu, supra note 185, at 57.
187. Chyong & Techerneya, supra note 2.
188. Chyong & Techerneya, supra note 2.
189 MANTZOS ET AL., supra note 181, at 33.
190. Industrial Overview, CENTER FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/energy/use/industrial.
191. MANTZOS ETAL., supra note 181, at 34.
192. Id. at 40.
193. Id.
71
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
production at home, or implement policies that work towards both of these
objectives.19 4
The EU's commitment to lowering CO 2 emissions has been a major
defining factor in its modem policy approach.195 This commitment has made
several EU countries leaders in producing green energy,196 but is also one of the
major forces driving Europe to import energy sources.197 A unified approach has
already been laid out as crucial to success in energy security for the EU.' 98 The
EU must now either import less energy or at least demonstrate it is capable of
importing less energy if it is to achieve energy security and strengthen its
bargaining power in international policy. The EU's current policies (most
important of which is the European Union Emissions Trading System, or EU-
ETS)'99 cannot achieve this goal, and stand to exacerbate the problem of reliance
on imported energy.
A. EU-ETS
The "phase one" implementation of the EU-ETS in 2005 was described as
a "learning-by-doing" pilot program, limited in its scope.200  "Phase two"
implementation of the program takes into account policy lessons learned, attracting
more participating nations, and increased the proportion of emissions auctioned off
rather than granted freely.201 Eight years into the program, the EU-ETS has been
successful in establishing a vibrant market for emissions permits, with an
increasing trading volume propped up by involvement from several private market
players.202 It would certainly be an exaggeration to say that the EU-ETS was not a
political accomplishment, and unlike Kyoto, the EU-ETS represents an active
international climate policy.2 03
Despite the limited success in the above areas, the EU-ETS has been
tangled by economic deficiencies and plagued by unrealized environmental
goals.204 While embraced by environmentalists and climatologists at its inception,
many of the EU-ETS original proponents have lost faith and have even called for
either sweeping reform or scraping of the program.205  According to UBS
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Investment Research, the EU-ETS has cost $287 billion USD through 2011 and
had almost zero impact on the overall volume of emissions in the EU.206 This was
the result of an over-allocation of allowances, which was further exacerbated by
the 2008 financial crisis, and ultimately led to a collapse in prices on the carbon
market.207 The third phase of the EU-ETS, running from 2013 to 2020, aims to
reduce greenhouse gases by 20% compared to the EU's 1990 emission levels.2 08
This target falls a long way short of what environmentalists suggest to avoid
dangerous climate change.209
Excess Provision of Permits
The principal failure of the EU-ETS can be drawn back to the
implementers succumbing to industry pressure and freely allocating too many
permits.210 Even sometime after implementation, the EU-ETS system auctions off
only 40% of the allowances that the policy distributes.2 11 This over-allocation of
emissions permits exceed what was necessary for the industry to adapt to difficult
economic times,212 As in the various stages of program implementation, the yearly
emission limits of the system were set higher than the emissions in previous
periods, even periods before the financial crisis of 2008 which lowered general
emission levels.213 This did not just ease cost on high emitters, but ruined the plans
of low emitters that wished to sell their allowances; from 2008 - 2014, allowances
prices dropped by over 500%.214
This will leave irreversible damage to the prospects of clean innovation,
as industrial actors in both the energy and finance industry may consider these
allowances a risky asset, due to their price history. The EU also ruined a chance to
attract clean energy capital, including investments and human capital in the form
of "green jobs."215 This phenomenon of professionals that have the capacity to
contribute to reduced emissions leaving the EU has been called "green job
leakage", and as a policy brief by the industry group "Carbon Market Watch"
explains,
The European industry is therefore at risk of falling behind in deploying
low-carbon technologies compared to their competitors abroad.
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Currently the most efficient cement production occurs in Asia,
particularly in India and China. In the steel sector, the European
installations often perform worse than the global average.216
These failures are particularly important in their nature. Since the allocation of
permits has been dependent on market dynamics, the EU-ETS has failed to yield
benefit certainty, one of the main advantages that a Cap and Trade program
boasts.217 According to the UBS report, over allocation could lead to price
increases across the EU as companies fail to sell their permits for their projected
price in the context of price collapses.2 18 The data analysis done by Carbon Market
Watch clearly shows that the European Commission's Market Stability reserve
(created in 2014) will not be enough to get the EU back on track.219 The plan of
the European commission to "backlog" allowances, slowly reducing the number of
auction allowances over the next few years below the original amount planned, is
only a temporary fix, as the current plan will allow the allowances to return to the
market in several years.220
B. The Energy Security Flaws Imbedded in Current EU Climate Policy
I have discussed above the issues, both theoretical and observed in
history, with the EU's dependence on natural gas from Russia. Natural gas usage
emits less carbon per unit of energy generated, so any policy that demands lower
emissions, but doesn't build new supply, is intuitively likely to increase this
reliance.221 More in depth research confirms this, and more; the UBS report
concludes that European demand for natural gas will continue to increase under
current conditions, and that this increase in demand is directly related to the EU-
ETS.222 The demand is projected to increase even further if the EU-ETS fixes its
weakness as a climate policy by ending the over auctioning and granting of
allowances.223 This increase in demand will almost certainly result in price
increases, with the final price being passed to consumers'.224 This will incentivize
some natural gas extractors to return to Europe, but most of the increased demand
will be met by increased imports,225 which will increase dependence on Russia and
further dilute the EU's policy leverage. Thus, the EU-ETS is not a system that can
meet its ambitious environmental goals while increasing energy independence. By
its nature, it can only do one or the other.
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1. Need for Cohesive Energy and Environmental Policy across the EU
The EU is surprisingly dependent on Russia for natural gas used to
heat homes and produce electricity.22 6
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Figure 6: Russian Natural Gas Destination2 2 8
Share of Russia's natural gas exports by destination, 2012
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The EU's dependence on natural gas is high, as Figure 5 demonstrates.2 2 9 President
Reagan correctly foresaw that dependence on natural gas pipelines and the gas they
would provide would indeed limit Europe's policy options, unless Europeans
would be willing to be left out literally in the cold.230 Certain countries in the EU
would suffer both deeply and immediately in the event of a gas shut off (as
happened in 2009), while some countries have developed the capacity to adjust to
slowdowns (between gas storage and alternative power supplies, including coal). 231
This is problematic because Russia could effectively increase divisiveness within
the EU, rendering the entire Union less effective at negotiating on an international
228. Russia, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (updated Jul. 28 2015), https://www.eia.gov/beta/
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level. This is a diplomatic reason that the EU needs to lower its natural gas
consumption.
The Treaty of Lisbon states that EU measures "shall not affect a Member
State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy
supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2) (c)," 232 while Article 194 reads:
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the
environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity
between Member States, to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy
market; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) Promote
energy efficiency and energy Saving and the development of new and
renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of
energy networks.233
This creates an inherent tension between state autonomy over energy policy and
grid integration within the union, which could be exploited by Russia due to
uneven economic effects in the event of a gas shut off.
Thus it is prudent, in attempting to stay true to the EU's original
intentions and in making better energy, environmental, and foreign policy, for the
EU to pursue a policy that can be both flexible and unified. Even allies abroad such
as the U.S. have joined the chorus of expert and policy maker voices calling for a
pooling of resources to create a united and cohesive strategy.234 Not only does a
unified strategy increase the bargaining power of the EU (the entire union
threatening to sanction Russian gas would carry significant diplomatic weight chip
with Russia), but the entire EU energy grid becomes more efficient, as a unified
strategy allows companies to deal with the same regulations and standards across
borders and compete on a larger level.235 These are just two of many interrelated
advantages of an integrated strategy in the EU.236
Over 70% of the EU's energy imports are unstable because of unstable
geopolitical situations and profound threats of nationalization, wherein a local
government seizes control of natural resource assets to use as a foreign policy
tool.237 A lack of a united, integrated European strategy is severely limiting on the
amount of weight states within the EU bring to the bargaining table.238 Because of
asymmetrical energy needs, economic conditions, and various social factors,
232. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 194, 2012,
2012/C 326/01 [hereinafter TFEU]; see also The Lisbon Treaty and Sustainable Energy, INFORSEORG,
http://www.inforse.org/europe/eu tablelisbon.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
233. Id.
234. Matthijs & Kelemen, supra note 177.
235. Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Conceptualizing EU Energy Security Through an EU
Constitutional Law Perspective, 36 FORDHAM INT. L.J. 1225, 1258 (2013).
236. Id.
237. Metais, supra note 5, at 20.
238. Metais, supra note 5, at 21.
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different countries in the EU have dealt with Russia differently, severely hurting
the EU's overall ability to bargain.2 3 9 A united policy could reverse that.
2. Potential Alternatives
As established previously, the EU is in need of alternatives to Russian
natural gas, ideally coming from a unified approach as shown in Figure 6.240
241Figure 7: EU Electricity Production from All Sources
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The EU is a global leader in clean energy and has a diverse set of options in
242
exploring substitutes for Russian natural gas. Current alternatives exist, but at
high price points and high risk.2 43 Many alternate importers are either very far or in
areas that are politically unstable (much more so than Russia).244 The EU does
239. Metais, supra note 5, at 22.
240. Breakdown of Electricity Generation by Energy Source, THE SHIFT PROJECT DATA PORTAL,
http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/Breakdown-of-Electricity-Generation-by-Energy-Source#tspQvChart.
241. Id.
242. Cassie Werber, The world's biggest polluter is now the global leader in renewable-energy
spending, QUARTZ (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.tsp-data-portal.org/Breakdown-of-Electricity-
Generation-by-Energy-Source#tspQvChart.
243. Vessela Tehemeva, Chi Kong Chyong, & Louisa Slavkova, Europe's alternatives to Russian
Gas, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentaryeuropes alternatives to russian gas311666.
244. Id.
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have a commission in charge of governing energy partners and making changes,
but this commission would be empowered by more alternatives.24 5
a. LNG (liquefied natural gas)
Natural gas that is exported in liquid form, rather than gas form, is known
as liquefied natural gas (LNG).246 LNG is exported by a wide variety of countries
in North America, the Middle East, Australia, and East Africa.24 7 LNG is more
costly to import though: it must be cooled, packed and shipped, and then re-
vaporized.248 A large port in the EU, that was costly to build, has essentially gone
unused due to a lack of liquefaction plants.249 Also worth noting, global demand,
especially in Asia, makes shipping LNG to Europe less profitable, and until prices
rise sufficiently in Europe, be it due to Russian cut-offs or a determination to be
less dependent on Russia, there is little chance LNG will replace Russian natural
gas anytime soon.250 So although LNG is a very viable but expensive option, it
would require significant investments in producing countries to take advantage of
this particular alternative, but the U.S. just might be willing to make those
investments.25 1 Regardless, the EU has been strongly encouraged to pursue more
252 253LNG consumption. Shale Gas faces similar issues.
b. Coal
The EU's pursuit of leaving coal and similarly "dirty" (high emissions)
forms of energy has directly lead to increased reliance on imports in an important
254 haway. Coal has been looked own upon politically in the EU as it is a dirty form
of energy.255 It is also somewhat scarce, with only Poland containing significant
reserves. 256 That said, coal has not completely faded away as a viable source of
energy for some parts of Europe, as Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria
all have Coal as a majority source for energy.257 Since Europe has ambitious
climate goals in the long-term, Coal is only going to play a small role in Europe's




248. Frank Dohmen &Alexander Jung, Cold Turkey: How Germany Could End Russian Gas




251. Patti Domm, US. exports of LNG mark a turning point in the market, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/25/us-exports-of-liquified-natural-gas-mark-a-tuming-point-in-the-
energy-market.html.
252. Chyong & Tcherneva, supra note 2.
253. Dohmen & Jung, supra note 248.
254. See Eurostat Statistics Explained, supra note 30.
255. Id.
256. Id
257. Chyong & Teherneva, supra note 2.
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could help bridge a gap between an energy mix oriented toward Russian gas and
one that is far less dependent.
c. Nuclear
Nuclear energy is a controversial subject in Europe due to security
concerns about nuclear energy post-Fukushima, a disaster involving nuclear energy
in Japan.25 8 That said, the EU still produces about 30% of its energy using nuclear
plants.259 Because of this, nuclear is part of EU's energy future plans already, as
the EC has detailed out the best countries where nuclear can be expanded.260
Russian aggression may be the key variable in convincing Europe to expand its
nuclear capacity and make serious investments, especially because some of the
nations where nuclear is viewed as a potential new alternative are toward the east
side of Europe, near the Russian border.261
Perhaps the biggest challenge for nuclear advocates in Europe is the fact
that two of the largest economies in the entire EU are split on the nuclear issue.2
62
France already produces 75% of its energy from nuclear sources, and may be
expanding.263 The country is finding ways to recycle nuclear fuel into more energy
and plans to continue exporting this power.264 This is occurring while Germany's
political inertia runs the opposite direction, as generation capacity has angled
sharply downward.265 Political support is almost nil, with strong wind and coal
sectors for power generation and great public fear surrounding nuclear plants.266
As recently stated, energy policy will work best when integrated across borders.
That is not to say some per country flexibility to manage idiosyncrasies cannot
exist, but it stands to reason that some of this gap will have to be bridged between
these two major powers if the EU will be approaching energy holistically. At the
very least, low nuclear countries like Germany should show they are willing to




The EU is a global leader in producing clean or green energy. Because
of the region's ambitious climate goals, it is sensible to view clean energy as one
258. Emissions Trends, supra note 51, at 11.
259. Id. at 47.
260. Id at 24.
261. Id
262. Nuclear Power in France, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (July 2016), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/France/; Nuclear Power in Germany, WORLD
NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 2016), http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-
N/Germany/.
263. Nuclear Power in France, supra note 262.
264. Id.
265. Nuclear Power in Germany, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Oct. 2016), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany/.
266. Id.
267. BP, supra note 59, at 39.
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of the most attractive alternatives to Russian natural gas. If capacity could be
dramatically increased even further, the EU could successfully dilute Russian
influence via the tap weapon, while increasing scale production (and most likely
efficiency) in the clean energy sector. The biggest challenge with most renewable
energy resources is not just cost and capacity, but availability, as the sun and wind
do not tend to shine or blow when power is needed.268 According to the EC, there
are good reasons for caution and optimism in using renewable energy to increase
generation capacity in Europe.269 As an example, if solar power can only be relied
on six hours a day or 25% of a day, then four times the capacity needs to be built to
provide the same level of supply as a carbon fueled or nuclear fueled power
plant.270 Additionally, production capacity of renewable power has increased
rapidly, as shown in Figure 7.271








A recent EC report concluded that, "[a]lready today, 26% of the EU's power is
generated from renewables. About 10% of the total EU electricity is sourced from
variable renewable lectricity (such as wind and solar)."273 Much of the optimism
is in the heating sector using biomass driven methods and other similar
innovations.274
268. Id.
269. Renewable Energy Progress Report, COM (2015) 293 final, at 16 (Jun. 15, 2015).
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id. at 8.
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273. Id. at 3.
274. Id. at 3.
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IV. CARBON TAX
My proposal is a modified version of the traditional carbon tax. In this
section, before detailing my proposal, I review what a carbon tax is, setting the
stage for its utility in replacing the EU-ETS, before showing how my unique
approach to carbon taxation is an even more viable alternative. The carbon tax is
the most popular alternative to a Cap and Trade scheme.275 There have been a
multitude of proposals that range in size, scope, and structure, disproving the myth
that the Carbon Tax is an inflexible policy mechanism.276 Carbon taxes (of various
types) have been implemented in parts of Canada, Australia, Chile, Ireland, and
several other countries.277 The political viability of the Carbon Tax was limited by
the very word "tax" in the general history of the policy, yet as the real costs of any
effective climate policy become clearer, the carbon tax has returned to the forefront
of political discussion.278  This is because the policy has a set of distinct
advantages.
A. What is a Carbon Tax?
The Carbon Tax is a tax that is imposed per some amount of carbon emissions
by some entity (for instance a power plant, company, or vehicle) and often times
per Metric ton of Carbon Dioxide equivalent (MtCO 2e). 27 9 The tax has also been
used to isolate and discourage a particular form of consumption, such as fuel or
particular forms of energy.280 The Carbon Tax is an extremely straightforward
policy, taxing Carbon emissions, wherein economists have even tried to
approximate the marginal societal damage of each MtCO 2e emitted, with the
intention of creating a carbon tax that directly compensates society for
emissions.28
1. Advantages
The primary advantage of the Carbon Tax, especially when contrasted to
Cap and Trade, is the price stability or "cost certainty" provided by the tax.282
Having a predetermined schedule for exactly how much emissions will cost makes
integration with other policies simpler.283 Cost certainty allows businesses to
275. Phil Levy, The Carbon Tax/Cap-and-Trade Royal Rumble, FOREIGN POLICY (May 13, 2009),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/13/the-carbon-taxcap-and-trade-royal-rumble/.
276. Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14375, 2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4375.
277. Where Carbon is Taxed, CARBON TAX CENTER, http://www.carbontax.org/services/where-
carbon-is taxed/.
278. Metcalf, supra note 276, at 3.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Where Carbon is Taxed, supra note 277.
281. Roberta Mann, To Tax or Note To Tax Carbon - Is That The Question?, 24 NAT. RES. &
ENV'T 44, 44 (2009).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 45.
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better allocate resources, ensuring cost fluctuations do not become a significant
unexpected cost to high emitting firms nor a loss of expected revenue from
allowance sales, as was experienced during the allowance price crashes
experienced by Europe.284 Thus the Carbon Tax, a form of "explicit pricing",
inspires market confidence, as the costs and benefits are understood by industries
with significant emissions.285 This constancy allows companies, households, and
various other actors to adjust spending and investments to carbon prices, and may
even increase the political viability of maintaining an implemented climate policy
without compromises.286
Another comparative advantage of a Carbon Tax is the ability to create an
explicit price that attempts to quantify agreed upon negative externalities.287 While
in a Cap and Trade scheme, allowance prices reflect fluctuating short-term market
realities, these prices may or may not capture the true value of the negative
externalities caused in the long term.288 In fact, if the cost of these negative
externalities does not fluctuate over time, fluctuating allowance prices imply a
miss-pricing of carbon emissions as the price dips under and soars over the
determined societal cost.2 89
The simple fact that the Carbon Tax is a tax carries with it a certain
advantage of ease in implementation and flexibility, allowing revenue to pass
through and be redirected by an administrative institution that is already in place
and prepared to implement a tax.290 The tax structure can be adjusted to counteract
regressive or otherwise negative effects of the program before the program is
implemented or even while the program is in effect, more rapidly than in a Cap and
Trade scheme.291 The Carbon Tax as a policy is not a panacea, as real world
experiences are starting to show.292 I explore disadvantages in the following
section.
2. Disadvantages
The majority of carbon tax proposals lack the benefit certainty touted by
the advocates of Cap and Trade schemes.293 This concern is beyond theoretical. As
an empirical example, researchers examined a relatively early carbon tax policy
implemented in Norway and found that the tax was successful in reducing
284. VINCENT GILLES ET AL., supra note 206, at 17.
285. Climate and Carbon Aligning Prices and Policies, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (Oct. 2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment-and-
sustainable-development/climate-and-carbon_5k3z lhjg6r7-en [hereinafter OECD].
286. Metcalf, supra note 276, at 21.
287. Id.
288. Id at 27.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 24.
291. See generally id
292. Annegrete Bruvoll & Bodil Merethe Larsen, Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: Do
carbon taxes work? ENERGY POLICY (2004); Fredrik NG Andersson & Peter Karpestam, The
Australian Carbon Tax: A Step in the Right Direction but Not Enough, CARBON MANAGEMENT (2012).
293. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 217, at S269.
83
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
emissions, but not as much as originally hoped.2 94 There have been similar results
more recently in Australia.295 The final environmental benefits obtained by a
traditional carbon tax are highly dependent on complex factors, such as elasticity
of demand, external market fluctuations, and adjustment mechanisms available to
firms and households.2 96
Another disadvantage of the Carbon Tax that is commonly mentioned is
the regressive effects, as lower income households spend a greater portion of their
income on goods associated with high emissions, like energy and fuel. 297 These
effects are present in cap and trade proposals as well,298 but are less certain due to
carbon price fluctuations. Any carbon tax proposal that will equitably benefit
society should take regressive effects into account and use tax revenue or other
methods to counteract these effects.299 Indonesia is just one example that this is a
very effective and implementable aspect of a carbon policy framework.300
3. Modem Variations in Implementation
Necessity has dictated the traditional carbon tax be adjusted to various
social and economic realities. Since there is no carbon tax scheme as multinational
as the EU-ETS, I cover several examples of implemented carbon taxes here. This
is by no means a comprehensive review of the literature, but is a discussion
intended to show how experience has been reflected in the nuances of my policy
proposal. Carbon taxes are rarely fixed, but rather tend to increase marginally over
time at a pre-specified rate, allowing households and companies to slowly adjust to
the rate and corresponding price increases.30' Rates have also fluctuated and
exemptions been granted and revoked according to the economic and political
climate.302 Reinvestment of the tax revenue is another crucial factor that varies
significantly between schemeS303
Norway has one of the oldest and highest taxes on carbon emissions, and
can attribute some of its environmental successes to this tax.304 The Norwegian tax
features "extensive exemptions and differentiation of tax rates" by emissions
source, which is a less than optimal policy driven by political and economic
realities.305 While this scheme represents one of the most aggressive national
climate policies to date, a good analysis of the policy concludes with the
recommendation that countries attempting to implement a similar policy create "a
294. Bruvoll & Larsen, supra note 292.
295. Andersson & Karpestam, supra note 292.
296. OECD, supra note 285, at 28.
297. Id at 41.
298. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 217, at S269-71.
299. OECD, supra note 285, at 42.
300. Id.
301. Id. at lL.
302. Id. at 11.
303. Id. at 11, 14.
304. Bruvoll & Larsen, supra note 292, at 1.
305. Id at 5.
84 VOL. 45:1
2016 ACHIEVING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE FROM RUSSIA
more broad based, cost efficient tax, which is uniform for all sources and
greenhouse gases."306 Australia marks a much less successful example of a carbon
tax.30 7 After implementation of an aggressive tax in a toxic political climate, the
tax was repealed.30s It has been argued that the price was not high enough, and
that there was not enough financial support being given to clean energy
technologies.309
The Canadian province of British Colombia is one of the great carbon tax
success stories.3o The original plan was politically controversial, but its
implementation was perfectly executed and the policy is still one of the highest and
most successful in the world today.311 The tax is roughly revenue neutral, enabled
by massive cuts that correspond to the tax.312  This proper reinvestment and
political fortitude to maintain a constant and predictable tax schedule has
contributed greatly to the longevity of the policy.313 It should be noted that the cuts
made are mostly realistic because of the ease of changing the energy supply in
British Colombia as opposed to other parts of the world; British Colombia contains
an abundance of hydroelectric energy.314  This implies that other countries
implementing a similar plan may need to invest more in alternative forms of.
energy.
V. THE CARBON TAx WITH REINVESTMENT (CTR)
Europe seems poised to continue to seek out natural gas providers3 1 5 and
continue to work with the EU-ETS as a regional climate strategy. 3 It is my belief
that the EU would be better served by implementing a policy strategy that
maximizes benefit and cost certainty while ensuring greater energy independence.
This strategy would involve adopting a Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (CTR)."
The CTR policy presents the best opportunity for Europe to become less dependent
on Russian energy without crippling its own economy, thereby taking away a
major policy weapon Russia currently holds. If the EU can levy a tax per ton of
emissions of carbon dioxide and channel the revenue to building new infrastructure
for energy production, emissions would dramatically decline while eliminating the
need for Russian natural gas within a period of 6-10 years.3 1 8
306. Id at 23.
307. Where Carbon is Taxed, supra note 277.
308. Id
309. See Andersson & Kerpestam, supra note 292.
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One of the principal questions of any carbon tax, as earlier discussed, is
how the revenue ought to be used by the government collecting the tax. 319 The
model under which the CTR reinvests revenue directly addresses energy
independence and carbon emissions at once, rather than attempting to balance the
policy objectives as competing ends.320 Other practical policy benefits abound: the
revenue is invested in infrastructure, thus creating significant economic stimulus,
and since the tax is straightforward and contains a broad revenue base, modeling
its effects can be done with a much higher degree of certainty than other
policies.321
A. Summary of the Design
The Carbon Tax with Reinvestment is a tax that immediately reinvests carbon
tax revenue in clean energy plants, with the intention of rebuilding a country's
energy supply away from emitting sources.322 The tax is simple, powerful, and
flexible. It can be implemented at a relatively low rate, at roughly $5/MtCO2e,
escalating on a predictable, linear basis over time.323 Reinvestment is flexible to
new technology, but the economic data implies that even without significant
technological advancements, such a tax could pay for a complete restructuring of
the energy infrastructure in many different economic circumstances.324
By quickly and efficiently reinvesting revenues, this policy is a strategy
that could create benefit and cost certainty; both the tax and revenue reinvestments
are implemented on a predictable schedule.325 As discussed above, there is a "pick
your poison" trade off of corresponding disadvantages in the cap and trade and
carbon tax debate.32 6 Cap and Trade provides benefit certainty via a set cap on
emissions, and the carbon tax provides cost certainty via a set cost per unit of
emissions. As I have presented in the in the sections above, when discussing real
world implementation of each policy, it is abundantly clear that policy intention,
when not coupled with practical economic plans, can be overcome by politicians
thereby invalidating both benefit certainty in cap and trade and cost certainty in the
carbon tax.327 The CTR problematically ensures both cost and benefit certainty by
adhering to a straightforward yet flexible tax and reinvestment schedule that
conforms to existing data on energy needs.328
Reinvestment to Reduce Global Emissions 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 355, 405
(2014) [hereinafter Sewalk].
319. Id. at 390.
320. Id. at 403-04.
321. Id. at 408.
322. Id. at 392-93.
323. Id.
324. Sewalk, supra note 318, at 392-93.
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B. Why All Consumers are in the Tax Base
The primary reason for the breadth of the tax base in the CTR is to minimize
the negative economic impacts of the policy, while producing enough revenue to
rebuild the required entire energy infrastructure.32 9 The wider the tax base is, the
more cost effective any carbon tax or cap and trade system will be.330 That said,
since narrow tax plans cannot isolate particular activities related to emissions and
make them particularly expensive, traditional proposals with a wide base may fail
to reduce emissions. 331 The CTR relies on changing the power supply from "dirty"
power to "clean" power, this substitution rather than dissuasion as the primary
mechanism for changing the relationship between emissions and consumption,
since energy sources with high emissions rates are replaced by sources with low to
no emissions.3 32 This substitution is "built in" to the policy, rather than relying on
a subjective dynamic.33 3
The principal justification for the wide tax base is a generalized and
systemic interpretation of the "polluter pays" principle.334  The origins of this
concept in formal documentation can be traced back to Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, stating that he "polluter, should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and
without distorting international trade and investment. "3 A broad interpretation of
this principle allows consumers to be held accountable for their systemic
contributions to pollution.3 36
Upstream taxation is likely to be passed on to consumers regardless of the
policy.337  Keeping the base broad will have a similar effect on the general
economy but will give upstream producers less incentive to combat the tax
politically and seek exemptions due to the automatically shared burden with
consumers.338 Producers do not have to "pass" the cost to consumers via price
hikes but directly share the tax burden across the production stream. 9 Thus, the
wide tax base is especially effective in the context of this policy.
329. Id. at 391-92.
330. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 217, at S269-71.
331. Id
332. Project Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, supra note 317 ("substitution rather than




335. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992).
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C. Revenue Creation and Reinvestment
As enumerated in the original work on this policy proposal, tax revenue is
collected and immediately invested in creating clean energy plants.34 0 These plants
are an optimized mix of Solar, Wind, Geothermal, and Nuclear.34 1 In the original
proposal, the tax is implemented at the modest rate of $5 USD per MtCO 2 e and
escalates by $5 per ton each year, a linear form that makes adjustment by
economic actors particularly easy and allows the tax to rise to $50 per ton within
ten years.342 At reasonable economic growth assumptions and with no assumed
technological progress in the clean energy sector, the tax revenue peaks at 1.84%
of GDP for the EU.343 The following figures are taken from this proposal and
show the implications for energy production and the economy at large.
Figure 9: Rapidly Declining EU Emissions with a CTR In-Place344
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340. Id. at 393.
341. Id at 393.
342. Id at 393-94.
343. The United States was modeled as well, with the tax revenue peaking at 2.49% of GDP.
344. Figure 8 created by author calculates the emissions as clean power plants are built thereby
displacing power plants that emit carbon. Note that the emissions from buildings and utilities/industry
decline rapidly reaching 0 around the year 2035 as fossil fuel plants are displaced by nuclear, solar,
wind and deep geothermal power plants, among others. However, remaining auto, truck, bus and
airplane emissions would require a shift from fossil fuels to batteries, fuel cells and bio-diesel to
continue declining.
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Figure 10: Estimated Revenues from CTR as a percentage of the EU-27 GDP
(2013-2032)345
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While this original proposal uses current data to predict time and cost of building
out a new energy infrastructure, there is no reason the energy portfolio could not
be changed to reflect technological advancements in a particular form of energy or
changing energy needs in a particular context.346
Flexibility in Reinvestment
There is a deep variety of options when it comes to returning carbon tax
revenue equally to all payees, many of which are simply oriented towards
discouraging carbon energy use and encouraging thrifty energy use.347  The
achievement of revenue neutrality or mitigation of negative effects may become
subjective, and doesn't present any straightforward benefits, i.e. the reduction of
actual emissions proactively.34 8 The CTR is specifically designed to reinvest in a
format that creates guaranteed benefits directly addressing the sectors (energy and
transportation) that carbon policies are meant to reform.349  The energy and
transportation sectors offer a specific opportunity, because the rate of negative
outputs (carbon emissions), are subject to technological changes.350 This means
that reinvestment into various new energy plants can be optimized by energy
generated per unit of emissions, and shifted toward energy sources that become
less emissions intensive over time due to technological change.351  This is a
345. Revenues are calculated at $5/ton of GHG emissions in year 1, rising by $5/ton each year
until the carbon tax rate reaches $50/ton in year 10. All goods and services, domestic and imported, are
taxed based on emissions intensity. Sewalk, supra note 319, at 393-94.
346. Id. at 383.
347. See Metcalf, supra note 276.
348. Sewalk, supra note 318, at 12.
349. Project Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, supra note 317, at 15.
350. Id. at 18.
351. Id.
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particular advantage in the context of Europe, where as stated earlier countries
have very different energy sectors.
D. The CTR's Legality Under International Trade Agreements
Another non-trivial issue is the legality of the CTR and similar policies under
the World Trade Organization (WTO) policies. As discussed above, carbon
leakage is an issue that both traditional carbon tax and cap and trade schemes
face.352 To deal with carbon leakage, many policymakers have begun to consider a
border tariff dictated by carbon emission rates in the source country.353 This
concept is referred to in the literature as the "border carbon adjustment" (BCA).354
BCAs are a specialized form of the Border Tax Adjustment (BTA), an established
355
policy norm.
The CTR features a BCA that is an easily implemented policy aspect.356
Since various entities are taxed at a fixed, linearly increasing rate, the BCA is
calculated the same way." 7 To achieve the benefits the CTR touts, this aspect is a
vital part of the policy scheme.35 8 I discuss the overall economic impacts of BCAs
below, but first want to address the legality of such measures under the WTO.
Most BCAs have come under scrutiny for being potential cases of "green
protectionism", which is essentially protectionist trade measures being
masqueraded as climate policy.359  Environmental and trade groups agree that
green protectionism sets a dangerous precedent and must be avoided.360
Fortunately for the proposal, the BCAs that work best with the CTR have been
extensively assessed for WTO comparability, and do not pose a serious threat of
being challenged in the WTO.36' This is because straightforward domestic policies
can be easily reflected in such a BCA.362
352. See discussion infra Section IV.
353. Emil Dimantchev, To make European climate policy work, we need to put a carbon price on
imports, ENERGY POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.energypost.eu/make-european-climate-policy-work-
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E. The CTR Can and Should Replace the EU-ETS Immediately
The EU is stuck between a rock and a hard place, as deep dependence on
Russian natural gas has coincided with a collapsing Cap and Trade scheme. As
extensively detailed above, the CTR is a fantastic policy option for improving the
relationship between the climate and the international economy. The EU-ETS is
fraught with difficulties, including profit mechanisms I failed to mention and
complicated implementation risks.364 Below, I go into detail on the benefits of
such a policy to the EU, including novel insights into the ability to create energy
independence for the region and the geopolitical ramifications of that achievement.
A CTR is very straightforward, and rapidly reduces carbon emissions.365 The
generation of new energy sources shown above allows the EU to gain natural gas
366
independence from Russia within six to ten years. As previously discussed, the
CTR would provide both the principles of benefit certainty by replacing energy
sources with high production of carbon emissions, and cost certainty through fixed
prices on carbon emissions.367 This is of special benefit to Europe because of its
booming clean energy sector and lack of current bargaining power with Russia.
While CTR proposals have focused on various countries in the past, modern
geopolitics dictates a special urgency for a. CTR in the EU.368
The Carbon Tax with Reinvestment would directly target all carbon
consumers, or citizens, through a strategy that focuses on the end consumer, by
taxing consumption.369 All goods and services in Europe, as well as imported
goods and services, would carry a tax based on the carbon intensity of a particular
product.3 70 By holding every person responsible for his or her carbon footprint and
establishing a predetermined price on carbon emissions, this tax would secure the
principle of cost certainty. The EU-ETS, while currently deeply flawed, showed a
political willingness in the EU to accept policies that impose higher costs on
various forms of consumption371 Thus, while a widely applied tax is normally
politically difficult to implement, the CTR will make costs resulting from climate
policy more predictable, thereby becoming perhaps more politically desirable than
the current scenario of costs which rise unpredictably.
In addition, and the most important characteristic of this scheme, the revenue
from taxation would be funneled into building new infrastructure for clean and
inexpensive energy production, thus providing the principle of benefit certainty.
Wind, geothermal, nuclear and solar facilities among others would replace existing
power plant infrastructure, while industry, buildings and homes could replace
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natural gas for heating with clean electric power, thus, further reducing natural gas
dependence.372 As mentioned earlier, the EU is a leader in clean energy
technology and production.3 7 3 The simple projections already completed on the
EU's implementation of a CTR3 74 are thus very conservative, and the powerful
conclusions reached in this paper may actually be understating potential benefits in
the long run.
In this particular proposal, independence from Russian natural gas is
considered an immediate priority. As such, in order to rapidly achieve progress in
terms of independence from Russian natural gas and in efforts to lead the world in
reducing emissions, the tax rate start would be $50 per ton of CO 2-
375 Any and all
revenues collected would be funneled into the rapid deployment of various kinds
of clean energy power plants. As earlier stated, the CTR is inherently flexible, and
adjustments to reinvestment strategy could be made as Russia becomes a better
international cooperative force and as the EU's priorities change, since the simple
threat of climate trade policy can effectively change the behavior of national
governments relatively quickly.' 76 These adjustments are far beyond the scope of
this work, which aims to look at the economic and political implications of a
simple proposal.
1. Advantages Over Current Approaches (Cost and Benefit Certainty)
As detailed above, carbon tax proposals are generally considered to lack
"benefit certainty", as no direct restraints are imposed, but carbon is simply made
more expensive to emit.377 The CTR is a powerful policy tool because it manages
to capture both benefit and cost certainty.s It can be demonstrated that
reinvestment of tax revenue can be used to build out energy infrastructure to
decrease and almost eliminate carbon emissions resulting from the sector. This
creates the unique advantage of capturing both cost and benefit certainty, which
not only makes the CTR a great environmental policy tool but, as detailed in this
paper, a powerful foreign policy driver.
2. Economic Sustainability and Stimulus
In addition to the simplicity of an overarching carbon tax with no
exceptions, and reinvestment in the future's "green" energy, the CTR boasts
several other advantages. Citizens will reap the economic benefits of cheaper
energy by utilizing energy that runs from new and more efficient infrastructure.
Utility providers will not have to bear the burden of funding new infrastructure, as
this will be financed by the tax itself. Additionally, the investment in new
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infrastructure will actually create new jobs, estimated at over 600,000 jobs for
construction and over 2.5 million direct, indirect, and induced jobs for the EU. "
The tax could be easily implemented by utilizing preexisting tax administration
and monitoring techniques under the European Commission.38 0 Lastly, a Border
Tax Adjustment (BTA) could be incorporated within the CTR framework, evening
the playing field between domestic producers who are faced with constraints on
their GHG emissions and foreign competitors who have no such restrictions.
3. Increased Energy Independence - Exploiting a Hidden Point of Leverage
The inescapable fact is that EU reliance on Russia for energy makes
Europe weak. However, this relationship is defined by mutual dependence, thus
presenting an opportunity for European leverage. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, trade in oil and natural gas earns Russia 70% of its
$515 billion USD in annual export revenue and accounts for 52% of the federal
budget. 3 8  Underlining mutual dependence, according to Gazprom, about three-
fourths of natural gas exports in 2013 went to Western Europe.382 Thus, while
cutting back on Russian natural gas would seriously increase European autonomy
and augment its ability to execute more meaningful sanctions, dependence could
seriously threaten the menace of a Russian natural gas power. Elaborated in
President Putin's thesis as vital to the nation's economic development, this natural
resource power would be diminished as Russia would have no other viable export
market.11
Initially, the EU should increase U.S. coal imports, as the U.S. has the
capacity to rapidly increase coal exports to the EU and would serve as a reliable
resource.384  This would immediately impact Russian natural gas exports,
consequently undermining Putin's ability to wield natural gas as a diplomatic
weapon. With the tax in place and all revenues being deployed to build new
alternative and nuclear power facilities, the EU could become independent from
Russia with regards to natural gas within six years (2021) as shown in the figure
below.
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Figure 11: EU Natural Gas and Coal Usage and Russian Imports under CTR385
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With the CTR in place, the EU would experience a rapid and sharp decline in
emissions and resulting decline in energy imports. By 2021 the EU could be
independent of Russian natural gas leaving President Putin an unenviable situation
to negotiate with the Chinese to sell natural gas. This policy could very well force
Russia to limit its military modernization and focus its energies on modernizing
and diversifying the Russian economy.
4. Flexibility
One of the key strengths of this policy is the fact that there is stable
revenue creation to reinvest in energy sources. While more programmatic policy
approaches may be difficult to adjust to changing realities (like the EU-ETS
385. The author, using the model he developed for his dissertation, modeled the EU-27 adopting
the CTR and temporarily increasing coal imports from the U.S.. The result is that coal consumption
increases by 10% for a period of approximately 7 years, while clean energy infrastructure is built in the
EU. The result is an initial and then continuous decline in Russian gas imports until the early 2020's
when Russian gas imports stop.
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program) this policy has no predetermined rules for the massive amounts of tax
revenue created. To ensure energy and environmental security the EU should
adopt the CTR while temporarily increasing coal imports from the U.S., a reliable
supplier.'86 Thereby undermining Putin's ability to use natural gas as a weapon.
That said, the EU could adjust reinvestments of tax revenue according to Russia's
actions to achieve various goals.
Once this policy is adopted there would be a rapid, sustained decline in
emissions with a corresponding increase in energy security and independence.
Naturally, environmentalists may sharply oppose increased coal consumption, even
when temporary. Regardless, coal plants mark the fastest way to become
independent of Russian natural gas. Thus this piece of the proposal can be viewed
as a potential policy "stick" that can be held as an option contingent upon Russia's
actions. Perhaps of greater importance, it would only be temporary and require the
refurbishment of existing plants not the construction of new ones. And the result
of this policy would still see EU emissions collapse as well as Russian natural gas
imports collapse. If the EU stops importing Russian natural gas within seven years
and China is not so inclined to import, Russia would be faced with the fact that it
needs to reform its economy rather than continue to rely on energy exports.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this paper concludes, Russia has again proven their unreliability as an
exporter and their willingness to use the tap weapon. The EU needs to establish
that it can create alternatives to Russian natural gas. It is likely that Russia would
be compelled to establish security of exports if the tap weapon could be rendered
ineffective by alternate options. The CTR creates serious reinvestment prospects,
and if Russia did somehow show a commitment not to use the tap weapon, the
revenue from the CTR could be reinvested in much needed Russian atural gas
infrastructure. Thus, this policy, while providing important benefits to Europe, is
something that could benefit the entire region.
The EU's current climate mitigation strategy hobbles the EU from
pursuing an independent foreign policy, specifically in respect to implementing a
meaningful response to Russia's brazen actions in Ukraine.38 8  Particularly
alarming is that this reliance is projected to increase,3 8 9 emphasizing the urgency of
a new policy. By adopting a new energy and climate strategy, the EU could
rapidly achieve energy independence from Russia (six years), no longer need coal
or natural gas within twenty years and reduce its emissions upwards of 70% in
those same twenty years. Furthermore, this would deprive Russia of its
386. See Project Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, supra note 317.
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geopolitical energy weapon, postpone the impact of a carbon tax as it is project
financed, and would stimulate the EU economy significantly by creating a large
influx of jobs thereby reducing the unemployment from 11.9% to under 10%.390
390. See Project Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, supra note 317.
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